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11 Introduction
"Unlike smaller organizations, the transnational NGO can demonstrate quickly
and e¤ectively to several constituencies at once that its people are ’on the ground’,
responding to an emergency. CARE, for example, demonstrated simultaneously
to television audiences in Britain, the United States, Canada and Australia that
it was operational only days after the 1992 disaster ’broke’ in Somalia - simply
by changing the face and the accent in front of the camera" (Smillie 1995: 202).
Along with increased international trade and investment ‡ows, another key market inte-
gration phenomenon has been happening for about half century: the globalization of the mar-
ket for donations to charitable causes. While until relatively recently development-oriented
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) raised funds in the countries where they had been
founded, nowadays they heavily rely on raising funds through their foreign a¢liates. Table
1 shows statistics for some of the main global NGOs: the number of distinct country o¢ces
that conduct national fundraising campaigns goes from 10 (for CARE) to 65 (for World
Vision). These organizations are development heavyweights: their annual budgets are in the
range of 600 to 2100 mln U.S. dollars.
[Table 1 about here]
Concerning the timing of this phenomenon, Figure 1 presents the historical timeline of
the globalization for three well-known NGOs: Plan International, Oxfam, and MSF. We see
that the main surge in globalization (i.e., the opening of foreign a¢liates) happened mainly
during the 1980s and 1990s.
[Figure 1 about here]
Geographical patterns behind this globalization phenomenon are also quite interesting.
Table 2 lists the MSF’s a¢liates and their years of foundation. The …rst foreign a¢liates
are in Belgium, Switzerland, and the Netherlands, with other European a¢liates following
in the same decade. The …rst a¢liate outside Europe is in the US, and in mid-1990s, the
MSF expands its donor base into such exotic destinations as the United Arab Emirates.
[Table 2 about here]
2Why did these global NGOs emerge? Why did this phenomenon develop mainly starting
in the 1980s? What can explain the geographical pattern of NGO globalization? And is this
aid market globalization good for bene…ciaries and donors? This paper presents an economic
analysis of this phenomenon that has not been studied by economists so far.
As Smillie (1995) points out in his poignant account of the development NGO sector, most
big NGOs started out as a response from some Western country’s activists to a particular
disaster in a developing country. Initially such an NGO raised funds only in its country
of origin; however, soon it established a¢liates in other developed countries, becoming an
international entity, similar to a multinational …rm.
One well-known example is Oxfam. Oxfam UK was established in Great Britain in 1943
to provide relief after the Greek famine of the same year. In 1960, it opened its Canadian
a¢liate, Oxfam Canada. Shortly, two more foreign a¢liates, Community Aid Abroad (the
Australian branch) and Oxfam New Zealand, were opened. Then followed the branches in
continental Europe and Japan. The total number of a¢liates now has reached 13. The
return on these investments was impressive. For instance, the initial investment to open the
Canadian branch cost 60 000 pounds, and by 1970, this branch raised and sent 1.2 million
pounds overseas (Black 1992).
The NGO practitioners suggests that a key reason behind this internationalization is
domestic competition for donations. As Dichter (1999) points out, "New markets are ag-
gressively tackled... NGOs have come up against donor saturation in their home countries...
By going to [foreign] countries, the costs of recruiting new donors [are] lowered." Moreover, as
the opening quote suggests, there might be increasing returns to scale in running fundraising
campaigns internationally.
The competition for funds has its downsides, as it may lead to the "excessive fundraising"
problem (Rose-Ackerman 1982). She shows that tougher competition between NGOs can be
welfare-reducing because this induces NGOs to spend excessive portion of their budgets for
fundraising activities. Moreover, the equilibrium number of NGOs is too big compared to
social optimum.
Thus, from an economist’s point of view, the globalization of the NGO sector driven by
the competition for donations raises several important questions. First, where does this glob-
alization come from? Second, what is the e¤ect of the NGO globalization on the fundraising
and production behavior of NGOs? Third, what are the welfare consequences of the NGO
3globalization?
The answers to these questions can run counter to the standard economic intuition.
Although the models of international trade with monopolistic competition suggest that the
welfare in a fully integrated market is higher than under autarky (Krugman 1979), when
it comes to non-pro…t organizations such as NGOs the result is less clear. Gnaerig and
MacCormack (1998) note that "the major national fundraising markets have developed into
international bazaars where one can …nd competitors from a range of countries o¤ering
everything fund-raisers all over the world could think of. This looks like the beginning
of a very tough selection process - at the end of which there will probably be left only a
handful of highly professional, global NGOs..." This reduction in the number of NGOs and
restructuring of the sector can imply a certain loss of welfare, in particular that of donors,
who may …nd that the globalization reduces the number of NGO varieties present on the
market.
The market for development donations with NGOs has the following key characteristics:
￿ NGOs are di¤erentiated. NGOs are mission-driven organizations and their mis-
sions di¤er substantially among themselves. Werker and Ahmed (2008), for example,
give the following typology of the U.S. international-development NGOs, based on the
NGOs’ missions: general development and assistance (21% of the total 4125 orga-
nizations); agriculture (2%); economic development (5%); international relief (29%);
education (12%); health (18%); science and technology (1%); democracy and civil soci-
ety (2%); environment, population, and sustainability (5%); human rights, migration,
and refugee issues (5%). There is also evidence of strategic di¤erentiation of NGOs
operating in the same country: Fruttero and Gauri (2005) …nd, based on data from
Bangladesh, that NGOs operating there try to di¤erentiate themselves strategically by
avoiding to duplicate e¤orts of other NGOs.
￿ Donors give in reaction to fundraising campaigns. The importance of fundrais-
ing is very well-known in the NGO industry. Smillie (1995, Chapter 7) argues that
given the importance of fundraising as the source of revenue, at its extreme form the
appeals become ’the pornography of poverty’, i.e. shocking images of starving children
that far outweighs reality. According to Andreoni and Payne (2003), there exists the
Iron Law of Fundraising: "[Donors] seem to have latent demands to donate. Until
they are asked, this demand goes unexpressed... Individuals who may have ’always
4wanted to donate’ but ’didn’t know the address’ will be able to donate when solicited
by the charity." The authors also provide the empirical evidence for this mechanism:
based on the U.S. data, they …nd that when a charitable organization receives a gov-
ernment grant, it strategically reduces its fundraising activities which leads to a partial
crowding-out of the grant (i.e. the total funds of the charity increase but by the amount
less than the entire grant).
￿ NGOs compete with each other for donations. The competition for donors is a
long-standing and well-known problem for NGOs. For example, Hancock (1989) dis-
cusses the case of an American NGO, World Vision, aggressively competing for donors
in the Australian market with local religious organizations: "On 21 December 1984,
unable to resist the allure of Ethiopian famine pictures, World Vision ran an Australia-
wide Christmas Special television show calling on the public in that country to give it
funds. In so doing it broke an explicit understanding with the Australian Council of
Churches that it would not run such television spectaculars in competition with the
ACC’s traditional Christmas Bowl appeal. Such ruthless treatment of ’rivals’ pays,
however: the American charity is, today, the largest voluntary agency in Australia"
(Hancock 1989: 21).
In this paper, we build a simple economic model, based on these key characteristics of the
donations market, that addresses the questions posed above. We consider donors and NGOs
in two (developed) countries. NGOs have to raise funds to invest into development projects
in the less developed part of the world. The crucial modelling choice regards the structure
of the NGO industry. Given the evidence on NGO di¤erentiation, we naturally choose the
location model of horizontally di¤erentiated …rms (Salop 1979). Given that donors react to
fundraising, we use the a model of donor motivation of Andreoni and Payne (2003), i.e. the
"power of the ask" model. Finally, given that NGOs compete with each other for donors, we
assume that the main strategic variable of NGOs is informative fundraising and thus adopt
the advertising model of Grossman and Shapiro (1984).
We characterize the free-entry equilibria under autarky and market integration via multi-
national NGOs. More precisely, we de…ne as autarky the regime in which national NGOs in
either country can raise funds only in their countries of origin. The regime of multinational
NGOs depicts the situation in which there exist international networks of NGOs which are
attached to one speci…c mission (project). The network can raise funds in either country, but
5it has to establish local a¢liates (i.e., incur the additional …xed cost and hire a local NGO
entrepreneur). In such a regime, each international NGO network (composed of these local
a¢liates) invests all the funds collected into one project and exploits the potential economies
of scale in fundraising.
We …nd that the existence of national and multinational NGOs depends on two char-
acteristics of the home and foreign markets: the relative sizes of two markets (in terms
of the number of donors) and the returns to scale in fundraising. As multinational NGOs
exert higher fundraising e¤ort and therefore the competition between NGOs becomes more
intense, the multinational NGOs cannot coexist in the long run with the national NGOs in
both markets. If the returns to scale in fundraising are su¢ciently large, the national NGOs
in the smaller market disappear under the pressure of the higher competition. The national
NGOs in the larger market can coexist with multinational NGOs, but only if the larger
market is large enough (so that the more intense competition does not become too intense
on the larger market). On the other hand, if the returns to scale in fundraising technology
are not su¢ciently strong, there are no multinationals in equilibrium, as no national NGO
has an incentive to become multinational. We thus explain the birth of multinational NGOs
by the changes in the returns to scale in the fundraising technology.
We then compare the social welfare under the two regimes. We …nd that although there
are fewer NGOs in the regime with multinationals (compared to autarky), each NGO exerts
higher fundraising e¤ort and this intensive-margin e¤ect dominates the extensive-margin
e¤ect of exit. In other words, the total fundraising e¤ort increases, thus improving the
matching between donors and their preferred NGO varieties. Therefore, the social welfare is
higher in the regime with multinationals, as compared to autarky.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 builds the simple model of the
donations market for a single country. Section 3 presents the two-country model, derives the
equilibria with and without multinational NGOs, and evaluates the welfare under di¤erent
regimes. Section 4 links the facts concerning the internationalization of the donations market
to the theoretical model. Section 5 concludes.
62 Basic model
2.1 Setup
Consider a country populated by a community of atomistic donors. The mass of donors in
the community is L. Each donor has one unit of resource that can be converted into private
consumption with utility normalized to zero.
In the country, there is a given number of NGOs, i = 1;:::;N. Each NGO can run only
one project (distinct from any other project). This captures the idea that NGOs are founded
around missions: a …eld of development into which the founder of the NGO wants to invest
her e¤orts.
NGOs produce their services (i.e. actions directed towards their missions) using a simple
linear technology: 1 unit of resource put into the project of the NGO creates 1 unit of
output (in terms of service). The NGO …nances its projects from the funds collected through
fundraising activities. Here, we adapt the advertising model of Grossman and Shapiro (1984)
and assume that the fundraising activity has the following technology. Donors are located on
the circle of perimeter 1. Thus, the density at each point on the circle is L. The distance on
the circle is de…ned in the following sense: each donor has her perception of which dimension
of development is the most important one (e.g., promoting women’s rights, banning child
labor, providing education, …ghting infectious diseases, etc.), and the less the project of an
NGO corresponds to this perception, the "further" the NGO is located on the circle. The
NGOs send solicitation messages trying to convince donors to donate to their projects. Let
NGO i decide to reach ￿i fraction of the circle of donors with the solicitation messages. The
…nancial cost of this solicitation (which will have to be covered using a part of the funds
eventually collected) is A(￿i), with the following properties:
A(0) = 0; A
0(0) = 0; A
0(￿) > 0; A
00(￿) > 0; A
0(1) = 1: (1)
We assume that NGOs have a non-pro…t status. Thus, they face the so-called non-
distribution constraint in that they cannot distribute pro…ts and have to invest all the residual
funds into their projects (Weisbrod 1988):
Di = cDi + A(￿i) + Qi; (2)
where Di is the quantity of funds that the NGO collects, c is the cost of administering a unit
of donations, and Qi the funds that it invests into its project.
7NGOs maximize the impact of their respective projects (or the quantity of services they
produce towards their missions). From the non-distribution constraint, we get:
Qi = Di(1 ￿ c) ￿ A(￿i): (3)
We assume that all donors enjoy the utility from participating in development (in the
warm-glow sense of Andreoni (1989)). Thus, a donor giving to an NGO located from her at
distance x 2 [0;1] on the ’circle’, enjoys utility
U = u ￿ tx; (4)
where u is the participatory utility of giving and t is the unit ’transport’ cost, which mea-
sures the degree of conservativeness of donors with respect to their preferred dimensions of
development.
As in Salop (1979) and Grossman and Shapiro (1984), we will be looking for the symmetric
Nash equilibrium, assuming that NGO ’brands’ are equally spaced on the circle. Suppose
there are N NGOs on the circle. Then, the circle will be divided into N segments. We
assume that NGOs do not know the location of individual donors on the circle and thus
cannot target their solicitation messages. Let an NGO i try to reach a fraction ￿i of the
circle, while all other NGOs are trying to reach a fraction ￿. Since NGOs cannot target their
messages, the probability that any donor located in the segment of the circle located closest
to NGO i is
￿i





In the next two neighboring segments, with probability 1 ￿ ￿ a donor does not receive the
message of her closest-located NGO, while with probability
￿i
N she gets contacted by the





























8where the second equality is the approximation for a large N. If N is large enough, this
expression is also the ’covered market’ condition, i.e. that any donor has received at least
one solicitation.
2.2 Equilibrium








(1 ￿ c) ￿ A(￿i): (7)







The left-hand side of (8) is the marginal bene…t of trying to reach more donors: higher
fundraising e¤ort brings in more donations, because it increases both the probability that
the closest-located donors see a solicitation by i and the probability that the further-located
donors ’untouched’ by their preferred NGOs see a solicitation by i. The right-hand side is the
marginal cost: fundraising eats up resources that could otherwise be devoted to the project.
The NGO chooses the fundraising e¤ort that equates marginal bene…t with marginal cost.
In the symmetric Nash equilibrium, all NGOs choose the same level of fundrasing e¤ort,
which we denote with ￿n. The …rst-order condition (8) then becomes
L
N
(1 ￿ c) = ￿nA
0(￿n): (9)
It is easy to see that a larger market size (higher L), fewer competitors (lower N), and a
lower administration cost (lower c) lead to a higher fundraising e¤ort by NGOs. Note also
that, since ￿i = ￿ = ￿n, ￿nA0(￿n) now stands for the net donations that any NGO collects
in the symmetric Nash equilibrium.
Next, let us pin down the long-run number of NGOs on the market by imposing a
free-entry condition. We assume that NGOs are founded by NGO entrepreneurs, whose
alternative option is to work in the for-pro…t private sector. The relevant free-entry condition
requires that the equilibrium payo¤ to an NGO entrepreneur equals her wage in the for-pro…t
sector. Let the latter be F, and let her get an altruistic payo¤ from working towards the
mission of her NGO. For simplicity, we assume that this payo¤ is linear in the services
produced by the NGO.
9Then, the equilibrium number of NGOs satis…es
L
N
(1 ￿ c) ￿ A(￿n) = F: (10)
Using the …rst-order condition (9), we get
￿nA
0(￿n) ￿ A(￿n) ￿  (￿n) = F: (11)







In other words, inducing a small upward deviation from the equilibrium fundraising e¤ort
would increase the individual output of all NGOs.
Note also that using the properties of the fundraising technology (1), we have
 (0) = 0;  (1) = 1:
Then, from (11), we …nd that the symmetric free-entry Nash equilibrium fundraising
e¤ort is an increasing function of the …xed cost of entry:
￿n = e ￿(
+
F): (12)
The intuition is as follows: higher cost of entry means higher outside option for an NGO
entrepreneur. Thus, to induce her to enter the NGO sector, her payo¤ from entering, i.e.
the individual output in the NGO sector, has to be higher. This can only be achieved by
marginally increasing the fundraising e¤ort.
In other words, suppose the outside option of NGO entrepreneurs increases. At the
current level of fundraising the payo¤ that an entrepreneur gets in the NGO sector becomes
temporarily lower than the outside option. This induces some entrepreneurs to quit the NGO
sector. In turn, this implies that the marginal bene…t of fundraising increases and therefore
remaining NGOs increase their fundraising e¤ort.
This theoretical result is in line with the empirical …nding by Thornton (2006), who shows
that non-pro…ts spend more for fundraising in more concentrated markets (i.e. the ones with
the higher cost of entry).
The free-entry condition (10), together with (12), pins down the equilibrium number of





Given that both A0(:) and e ￿(:) are increasing functions, we can now state
10Proposition 1 The free-entry equilibrium number of NGOs increases in the market size








As we have explained above, higher …xed of entry induces exit of some NGO entrepre-
neurs. Similarly, a larger mass of donors (bigger L) or a lower cost of administering donations
(smaller c) implies higher net donations and thus a higher marginal bene…t of fundraising.
Then, NGOs put more fundraising e¤ort, which increases the output of each individual NGO.
In turn, this would increase the relative attractiveness of the NGO sector and induce higher
entry.




￿ A(￿n) = F: (13)
2.3 Welfare
We can now compare the social welfare in the long-run equilibrium with the social optimum.
Given that we try to evaluate how much welfare is generated by this market, the social
welfare function is the sum of the welfare of donors and of bene…ciaries minus the total
outside option of NGO entrepreneurs. The welfare of donors equals the total participatory
utility minus the total ’transport’ (misalignment-of-preferences) cost. For bene…ciaries, we
assume for simplicity that their utility (as a group) is linear in the total impact of NGO
projects.
Let’s …rst calculate the total ’transport’ cost for donors (we are omitting the subscripts
from the equilibrium values - for reading ease). Denote with zk the average ’transport’ cost
related to matching with the k-th closest NGO. The donors matched to their closest NGO
have the transport cost that varies from 0 to t
2N; then, for these donors, z1 = t
4N. Similarly,
for those that are matched to their 2nd-closest NGO, z2 = 3t
4N. Grossman and Shapiro (1984)




; k = 1;2;:::;N;








11The social welfare can then be written as
W = uL ￿
2 ￿ ￿
4N￿
tL + QN ￿ FN:
Using (13), the social welfare in the long-run equilibrium becomes




Suppose that the social planner has no control over the number of NGOs on the market,
but can impose restrictions on the amount of fundraising done by the existing NGOs. We
thus have to compare the equilibrium fundraising e¤ort with the socially optimal one for a
given number of NGOs.

















Remember that the Nash equilibrium fundraising is given by (9). Comparing it to (15),
we get the following
Proposition 2 For a given number of NGOs on the market, the equilibrium fundraising is
above the optimal amount if




The intuition for this results is the following. Higher fundraising e¤ort exerted by NGOs
has two e¤ects on social welfare. On the one hand, it reduces the ’transport’ cost for donors
(i.e. improves the matching between donors and their preferred NGOs). On the other hand,
it imposes a stronger negative externality, as higher fundraising by one NGO attracts donors
away from other NGOs (the "business-stealing" e¤ect). The condition (16) states that, given
the number of NGOs on the market, there is too much fundraising in equilibrium (with
respect to the social optimum) if the "business-stealing" e¤ect (given by the left-hand side)
is bigger than the social gain from the lower ’transport’ cost (described by the right-hand
side).
12Now suppose that the social planner can control both the number of NGOs on the market
and their fundraising e¤ort. Maximizing the social welfare with respect to the number of
NGOs and the fundraising e¤ort, we get
@W
@N
= ￿A(￿) ￿ F +
2 ￿ ￿
4N2￿




























Expression (19) implicitly pins down the socially optimal fundraising, ￿
W.
Note that the left hand side of (19) equals zero in the free-entry equilibrium (see (11)),
while the right-hand side is strictly positive. Therefore, we get
Proposition 3 The free-entry equilibrium fundraising is less than optimal:
￿n < ￿
W:
The intuition becomes clear if we look at the expression (19). On the left hand side,
￿A0(￿)￿A(￿) stands for an individual NGO’s output, which is also the private return of the
NGO entrepreneur. In equilibrium, she chooses the fundraising e¤ort ￿ such that under free
entry, this private return is just equal to her outside option. As we have discussed above,
fundraising plays two roles for social welfare. It has a positive social externality: higher
fundraising by an NGO increases the probability that donors within the NGO’s ’segment’
of the market will be contacted by this NGO and thus reduces the probability that they
will give to an NGO located further away from them (remember that the market is covered,
thus all donors are contacted by at least one NGO; however, not all donors are contacted by
their nearest NGO). But it also has a negative externality (the "business-stealing" e¤ect),
which reduces the output of all other NGOs and thus, under free entry, creates excessive exit.
Suppose that the equilibrium number of NGOs is equal to one that the social planner would
13have picked. Proposition 3 says that then, in equilibrium, NGOs would fail to internalize
only the positive externality, which means that they try to reach too few donors.
This intuition also helps to reconcile Propositions 2 and 3. In fact, Proposition 2 says that
for a given number of NGOs on the market, the equilibrium fundraising would be too low if
the positive externality is internalized less than the negative "business-stealing" externality.
Proposition 3 says that if the "business-stealing" externality is correctly internalized by




Now suppose there exist two countries, domestic and foreign, with the mass of donors L and
L￿, respectively. NGOs now can become ’multinationals’. We assume that a multinational
NGO is characterized by two essential features. First, multinational NGOs by de…nition tap
their resources internationally, conducting fundraising in several countries at the same time.
Second, their reputation and public image is highly attached to a speci…c dimension of devel-
opment on which they tend to consolidate all their actions. Indeed, most international NGOs
concentrate, by their statute (at least o¢cially), their projects and actions in one particular
domain. In other words, a multinational NGO is an international mission-driven organiza-
tion. We have presented some examples in Table 1. This attachment to a particular mission,
together with the internationalization of activities, allows multinational NGOs to exploit the
gains of specialization and economies of scale in terms of fundraising campaigns. Moreover,
the multinational status often gives an additional advantage to pursue the NGO’s mission
during negotiations with governments and supra-national organizations. For instance, UN’s
ECOSOC explicitly favors multinational NGOs by giving them more opportunities to attend
ECOSOC meetings and to submit written advice (Simmons 1998).
In our simple framework with two countries, we capture these features in the following
way. First, we assume that multinational NGOs can raise funds in both markets; however,
they need to establish local a¢liates. In other words, an NGO that wants to enter the foreign
market has to incur an additional …xed cost, f < F. Second, all the funds are invested in
one development project which corresponds to the speci…c mission of the NGO.
This, however, implies that the fundraising levels of the national and multinational NGOs
14would not, in general, be equal. Therefore, we cannot employ the usual procedure to solve
for a symmetric Nash equilibrium. Instead, we adopt the solution technique proposed by
Aghion and Schankerman (2004) and assume that an NGO does not know, when deciding
its fundraising e¤ort, which NGOs on the circle are national NGOs or multinationals. It
only knows which fraction of NGOs is multinational and operating in its market.
Formally, let’s denote with ￿i and ￿m the fundraising levels of national and multinational
NGOs, respectively, and let p be the fraction of national NGOs. Then we get the following
result:







where b ￿ is the expected fundraising e¤ort by any other NGO:
b ￿ = p￿i + (1 ￿ p)￿m:
Proof. See Appendix.
Compare (20) to (6): two expressions are very similar. This technique thus allows us to
break the usual symmetry of the Salop (1979) model without getting into the complication
of conditioning an NGO’s strategy on the type of its neighbors.
3.2 Equilibrium







(1 ￿ c) ￿ A(￿i):
Note that now the number of segments on the donation circles will not, in general, be
equal to the number of NGOs, given that some of them may become multinationals. Let’s
denote with N and N￿ the number of segments respectively on the home and foreign markets,
with n and n￿ the number of national NGOs in home and foreign countries, and with m the
number of multinational NGOs.







(1 ￿ c) ￿ A(￿i);











N￿(1 ￿ c) ￿ A(￿
￿
i):
The problem of a multinational NGO is to choose the fundraising e¤ort ￿m to maximize













(1 ￿ c) ￿ A(￿m) ￿ f:
Note that each of the three groups - national NGOs in the home country, national NGOs
in the foreign country, and multinational NGOs - is symmetric within, i.e. all organizations
within a group put the same fundraising e¤ort. Then, the number of competing NGOs in
the home and foreign markets has to satisfy the following equalities:







i + m￿m: (22)
For further notational convenience, let’s denote the marginal bene…t of fundraising in









We start by looking for an equilibrium in which home and foreign national NGOs coexist
with multinationals, i.e. in which n > 0, n￿ > 0, and m > 0.
We can prove the following
Proposition 5 National NGOs in home and foreign countries cannot coexist with multina-
tional NGOs in a free-entry equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix.
The economic intuition is as follows. For a multinational NGO, given that the same
fundraising e¤ort reaches donors in both countries, the marginal bene…t of fundraising is
B + B￿. Given that the cost of fundraising is increasing, this implies that a multinational
NGO puts higher fundraising e¤ort than a national NGO. The free-entry equilibrium output
of a multinational NGO (that comes from investing funds collected in both countries into
16her project) has to be equal to the total …xed cost of founding the headquarter NGO and the
a¢liate in the other country, i.e. f + F. Thus, the advantage of being a multinational is to
be able to collect funds in both countries using the same fundraising activity; however, this
comes at the cost of having to establish the a¢liate. Given the scale advantage in fundraising
that the multinational NGO enjoys compared to its national counterpart, whenever it is
bene…cial for a new NGO entrepreneur to enter as a national NGO in one of the markets,
there is an even stronger incentive for an existing national NGO to become multinational.
In the long run, this implies that at least in one of the countries, all national NGOs will
become multinationals. In other words, in the long-run equilibrium, at least in one of the
countries, the national NGOs will disappear.
Does this imply that in the long run, all national NGOs become multinationals? To
answer this question, let’s assume, without loss of generality, that L > L￿, and start looking
for the equilibrium in which national NGOs coexist with multinationals only in the larger
market, i.e. n > 0; n￿ = 0; m > 0.
It is useful to separate the analysis into two cases.
3.2.1 Case 1: Large economies of scale
Suppose that economies of scale from becoming a multinational NGO are relatively large, i.e.
the marginal cost of fundraising for a multinational is smaller than double of the marginal






0(e ￿(f + F)):
Moreover, suppose that the sizes of the two countries are su¢ciently di¤erent. Then we
can show the following result.
Proposition 6 If the economies of scale are su¢ciently large and the sizes of the two coun-




A0(e ￿(f + F)) ￿ A0(e ￿(F))
> 1; (24)
then in equilibrium the national NGOs in the larger country coexist with multinational NGOs
and there are no national NGOs in the smaller country:
n > 0; n
￿ = 0; m > 0:
Proof. See Appendix.
17The economic intuition for this result is as follows. Since for a multinational NGO the
marginal bene…t of fundraising is higher than for a national NGO (because it collects funds in
both markets contemporaneously), the multinational chooses higher fundraising e¤ort than a
national NGO. Note that the marginal bene…t also equals the average bene…t of fundraising,
which, in turn, determines the equilibrium payo¤ of the NGO. If, at the equilibrium, the
average return on fundraising from becoming a multinational (for an already existing national
NGO) is higher than that for a new national entrant (in other words, if the returns to scale
in fundraising are su¢ciently high), the multinational …rms exist in equilibrium.
On the other hand, suppose that the home country is su¢ciently large compared to the
foreign. Then, in equilibrium, given that a part of national NGOs in the home country have
become multinationals and thus have increased their fundraising e¤ort, the competition on
both markets becomes tougher. This higher competition drives out all national NGOs in the
smaller (foreign) market. Contrarily, in the home market, if the home market is su¢ciently
big, even under the higher competition there is enough space for the national NGOs.





A0(e ￿(f + F)) ￿ A0(e ￿(F))
:
Then we can show the following result:
Proposition 7 If the economies of scale are su¢ciently large and the sizes of the two coun-





A0(e ￿(f + F)) ￿ A0(e ￿(F))
;
then in equilibrium there are only multinational NGOs:
n = n
￿ = 0; m > 0:
Proof. See Appendix.
The intuition is simple: if home country is not su¢ciently large compared to the foreign,
sti¤er competition in the home market caused by the globalization of NGOs is drives out
national NGOs even in the larger market. Then, only the multinationals can exist in the
long-run equilibrium, and two countries essentially become one single donations market.
Figure 2 summarizes the above results.
[Figure 2 about here]
183.2.2 Case 2: Small economies of scale
Consider now the case with relatively small economies of scale in fundraising. The following
result is true:







0(e ￿(f + F));
then there are no equilibria with multinational NGOs.
Proof. See Appendix.
The intuition is straightforward. If the economies of scale in fundraising are relatively
small, there is no incentive for a new multinational to enter, because the payo¤ it would
get in equilibrium is lower than its outside option (Note that the free entry condition for
national NGOs imply that we do not need to check that a national NGO does not have
an incentive to become multinational). Contrarily, if the economies of scale were relatively
high, the payo¤ for a new multinational entrant would be bigger than its outside option and
thus in equilibrium some multinational NGOs would appear.
Figure 3 summarizes the …ndings for the case of small economies of scale.
[Figure 3 about here]
3.3 Welfare
We can now compare the social welfare under the di¤erent regimes.
We …rst need to calculate the total expected ’transport’ cost of donors. We have the
following result:
Lemma 9 Donors’ total expected ’transport’ cost is approximately equal to
T(b ￿) '




Thus, the generic social welfare function can be written as:
W = uL + L(1 ￿ c) ￿ NE(A(￿)) ￿ NF ￿
2 ￿ b ￿
4Nb ￿
tL =
= uL + L(1 ￿ c) ￿ N [pA(￿L) + (1 ￿ p)A(￿H)] ￿ NF ￿
2 ￿ b ￿
4Nb ￿
tL:
19Let’s start with the welfare in the free-entry equilibrium under autarky. For home and
foreign country, it is:
WjA = uL ￿
2 ￿ e ￿(F)
4ne ￿(F)























How does the ’transport’ cost of donors evolve with higher fundraising e¤ort of NGOs?
From (25), one can see than the ’transport’ cost is increasing/decreasing in e ￿ if
$(e ￿) ￿
h




is increasing/decreasing in e ￿.
Let’s now turn to the regime with only multinational NGOs (i.e., n = n￿ = 0 and m > 0).
We can then consider the two markets as just one larger integrated market, with L + L￿




2 ￿ e ￿(f + F)





2 ￿ e ￿(f + F)
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Compare (27) to (25)-(26). The total welfare under autarky is
WjA + W








Note that since the equilibrium fundraising e¤ort put by multinational NGOs is higher
than the one put by national NGOs, e ￿(f + F) > e ￿(F), and therefore
h




2 ￿ e ￿(f + F)
i
. Moreover, given that in the regime with only multinational NGOs the
returns to scale are large enough, we know that 2A0(e ￿(F)) > A0(e ￿(f +F)) . Then, the total
’transport’ cost is smaller in the regime with only multinational NGOs than under autarky.
In other words,
Wjm + W
￿jm > WjA + W
￿jA:
Proposition 10 The total welfare in the multinational-only integrated equilibrium is higher
than the total welfare under autarky.
20The economic intuition is as follows. Given that the marginal bene…t of fundraising is
higher for multinationals than for national NGOs, in equilibrium the former put more e¤ort
than the latter. On the other hand, the tougher competition in the presence of multinationals
drives out some NGOs. Thus, there are two mutually opposed e¤ects on donors’ ’transport’
cost: higher fundraising e¤ort reduces the ’transport’ cost, while fewer NGOs imply increased
’transport’ costs. However, the …rst - intensive-margin - e¤ect always dominates the second
- extensive-margin - e¤ect. Then, if there are only multinational NGOs, the resulting total
’transport’ cost for donors is lower in the integrated equilibrium than under autarky. In
other words, as higher total fundraising e¤ort implies lower probability of mismatch for
donors (i.e. that they give to an NGO di¤erent from the closest-located one), the increase
in welfare comes from the better matching of donors to their preferred projects.
What about the regime in with multinationals coexist with national NGOs? Consider
the home country (in which n > 0). The welfare on this market is















￿m ￿ A(￿m) ￿ f ￿ F
￿
￿
2 ￿ b ￿
4Nb ￿
tL;
where b ￿ is the average fundraising e¤ort (given that the home market has both national and
multinational NGOs):
b ￿ = p￿i + (1 ￿ p)￿m:
Then, using the free-entry conditions, we get
Wjmn = uL ￿
2 ￿ b ￿
4Nb ￿
tL = uL ￿
h















2 ￿ e ￿(f + F)
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Note that since b ￿ 2 [e ￿(F);e ￿(f + F)], we have
h









Therefore, the welfare in the larger country is higher in the ’mixed’ regime than under
autarky:
Wjmn > WjA:
21Similarly, for the smaller country, we have
h
2 ￿ e ￿(f + F)
ih
A














Thus, both countries gain under the mixed regime, as compared to autarky.
Proposition 11 The total welfare in the regime with both multinationals and national NGOs
is higher than the total welfare under autarky, for both countries.
Our results imply that the globalization of NGOs increases social welfare. The main fac-
tor behind this increase is the fact that despite the tougher competition and the reduction in
NGO variety, this variety reduction is always small enough as to imply higher total fundrais-
ing e¤ort and as to decrease the mismatch between donors and their preferred varieties. Thus,
although NGO globalization kills NGO variety, the globalization still is welfare-increasing.
Smillie (1995, Chapter 11) describes the likely future of the world donations market with
multinational NGOs as follows:
"Will the transnationals crowd out other Northern NGOs? It is already hap-
pening in the case of emergencies, and there can be little doubt that they are
eating into the ’development’ income of smaller one-country NGOs. There is so
much fundraising competition, and so few ways to learn about which NGO is
e¤ective, that individuals considering a donation simply go with the household
names: those seen every night on the news from the latest famine, cyclone, or
war zone. In the end, neither the market nor the need can justify or support the
proliferation of tiny Northern NGOs, each trying to be special, di¤erent, more ef-
fective, more e¢cient, more unique than the rest... New lookalike agencies appear
every year. Some of the hardier ones will undoubtedly survive, either because
they adopt some of the techniques of the transnationals, or because they develop
special expertise and carve out new niches in development education or fundrais-
ing. But some will surely vanish, ... victims of the increasingly sophisticated
fundraising techniques of the transnationals" (Smillie 1995: 210-211).
224 Discussion
Thus, how can we explain the facts concerning the globalization of NGOs described in
the introduction? Our model suggests that the trend of NGOs becoming multinational
organizations is driven by the economies of scale in fundraising technology. We must be
assisting to a move from the equilibria described in Figure 3 (when returns to scale in
fundraising were relatively low) to those in Figure 2 (with relatively large returns to scale).
Where did this change in the scale economies come from? Looking more closely into the
history of NGOs in the 1970s - 1990s suggests several potential answers.
One important phenomenon is emergencies. Smillie (1995) writes: "With the exception of
Plan International, most transnationals devote a signi…cant part of their fundraising e¤ort
and their programme expenditure to emergencies. In recent years, this has proved to be
the most important way for the very biggest fundraising NGOs, for example SCF UK and
Oxfam UK, to maintain and expand their market share" (Smillie 1995: 200). Clearly, in
the case of emergencies and humanitarian crises, when donors in all Northern countries are
willing to give, the same solicitation message can be relatively easily adapted for the donor
public in di¤erent countries. This is what the opening quote of this paper calls ’changing
the face and the accent in front of the camera’. It is very likely that the relatively low-cost
high-return fundraising opportunities triggered by humanitarian crises must be a key factor
behind increasing returns to scale and the multinationalization of NGOs. In fact, main global
NGOs (for example, those listed in Table 1) all have an important emergency component in
their missions. Another highly notable fact is that while the budgets of emergency-oriented
organizations such as those in Table 1 are between 600 and 2100 mln dollars, the biggest
multinational NGOs in other domains (environment, human rights) are much smaller: 94
mln dollars in the case of WWF and 39 mln dollars in the case of Amnesty International
(Werker and Ahmed 2008).
However, this alone cannot explain the internationalization phenomenon. Emergencies,
unfortunately, have been happening also in other decades; however, we do not observe the
surge in multinational NGOs before 1970s. It is another important development in the NGO
sector - the massive use of modern media technologies in fundraising appeals - that can per-
haps provide a better explanation. For example, concerning Oxfam, Smillie (1995) writes:
"Oxfams in Canada, the United States and elsewhere have bene…ted repeatedly from the
international media publicity earned by Oxfam UK workers in Bangladesh, Ethiopia and
23Rwanda... This, plus economies of scale and access to increasingly sophisticated communi-
cations technology give such organizations considerable advantage over the lone German or
French NGO operating on its own, regardless of quality of the work" (Smillie 1995: 202).
Similarly, in their account of the globalization of NGOs, Lindenberg and Bryant (2001)
write: "One of the major innovations, and a part of the process of ’becoming global’ in the
last several years, has been the establishment of international network o¢ces (for example,
the International Save the Children Alliance, Oxfam International, or CARE International)
charged with increasing the collaboration among the national o¢ces and providing, in some
cases, some services common to all... Much of the focus of the international unit has been
on helping individual members increase their local fundraising capacity - often by sponsor-
ing major fundraising events that the international o¢ce helps make happen, such as the
British Telecom-sponsored Around the World Sailing Race" (Lindenberg and Bryant 2001:
52). Bernard Kouchner, the founder of the MSF, uses the words "Law of the Hype" (La
loi du tapage), to describe the importance of media in case of emergencies. The more an
NGO talks about a certain emergency, the more individual donors are likely to give to this
cause: "an un-televised misery is an unknown misery" (Kouchner 1991). Thus, it is not
just emergencies per se, but the joint e¤ect of emergencies and of the use of mass media
technologies by NGOs, that can better explain the origin of these higher economies of scale.
Finally, a third important driving factor has been the changes in government policies
towards NGOs, in particular in Europe. For instance, concerning the use of matching grants,
we read: "Most Northern governments provide matching grants based partially on an NGO’s
domestic fundraising. The terms and conditions of the matching formulae vary greatly, from
less than 50 per cent to more than 90 per cent. In Sweden where ratios are generous and
competition is low, an American NGO, say, need only open an o¢ce in Stockholm, invest
(perhaps heavily) in fundraising, and then apply for a matching grant. This practice is
becoming especially fashionable in Europe with the advent of the European Community and
increasingly blurred national borders" (Smillie 1995: 202). A more generous matching grant
increases the returns on the same fundraising e¤ort, thus providing an additional incentive
for existing national NGOs to enter into other donor markets.
The pattern of expansion of particular NGOs is also revealing. For instance, the …rst
three foreign a¢liates of MSF - a French NGO - were in Belgium and Switzerland, while
the UK-born Oxfam’s …rst a¢liate was in Canada. Similarly, Plan International, founded
24by the British war correspondent John Langdon-Davies, conducted its …rst international
fundraising campaigns jointly in the UK, the US, and Australia. Quite naturally, the scale
economies are highest for the countries that share the same language: this basically means
accessing a foreign donation market at even lower cost.
5 Conclusion
As Lindenberg and Bryant (2001) argue, "One important way NGOs are changing to cope
with the demands of a globalizing world is to become more global themselves" (Lindenberg
and Bryant 2001: 15). This paper has analyzed this interesting market integration phe-
nomenon: the globalization of the donations market. We have shown that the key factors
behind this globalization are those that have increased the economies of scale in the NGOs’
fundraising campaigns. We have also found that despite the reduced variety of NGOs, the
globalization in the long run increases social welfare.
Of course, there might be other reasons why multinational NGOs are more productive
than their national counterparts. There might be economies of scale not only in fundraising,
but also in production. Or, multinational NGOs can better absorb falls in donations by
cross-subsidizing their a¢liates in case of a bad shock in one of the a¢liate countries. We
leave these extensions for the future work.
Another dimension which we have not explored in this paper is the misalignment of
interest between a¢liates in the same NGO ’family’. Recent episodes (e.g. disagreements
between MSF France and MSF Belgium) indicate that the missions of di¤erent a¢liates
might not always be perfectly aligned, which creates tensions and probably a¤ects both the
collection and spending of funds for di¤erent projects. One element that plays an important
role in these tensions is the degree of independence of the a¢liates from the headquarter
organization. Lindenberg and Bryant (2001, Chapter 5) discuss several associational struc-
tures: from unitary-corporate to federations to coalitions of independent a¢liate bodies, and
show that di¤erent NGO ’families’ stand at very di¤erent positions on this spectrum. Why
some multinational NGOs (such as World Vision) prefer a more centralized structure, while
others (such as Oxfam and MSF) opt for a more independent one? And, given that the mis-
alignment of interest between a¢liates probably reduces the productivity of a multinational
NGO, how should the welfare evaluation derived above be adjusted? These are very inter-
esting questions that lie beyond the scope of this paper, but are certainly worth exploring,
25analytically and empirically.
The donation markets worldwide are going through profound changes and multinational
NGOs are key actors in this change. This paper shows that we can fruitfully apply the tools
from international trade models to understanding these phenomena.
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6 Appendix
6.1 Proof of Lemma 4
The procedure is similar to that in Section 2.1, but we have to take into account that from the
point of view of NGO i, any rival NGO can be either national (with prob. p) or multinational
(with prob. 1￿p). The calculation for the segment in which NGO i is located is identical to
that in Section 2.1, because the types of the rivals do not matter. For the next-neighboring
segments, the expected probability that the rivals located in those segments do not contact a
27donor located there is p(1￿￿i)+(1￿p)(1￿￿m), and thus the expected donations collected
in those segments are equal to
￿i
N [p(1 ￿ ￿i) + (1 ￿ p)(1 ￿ ￿m)]. Proceeding in the similar





















where b ￿ denotes the expected fundraising by an NGO whose type (national or multinational)
is unknown:
b ￿ = p￿i + (1 ￿ p)￿m:








6.2 Proof of Proposition 5
The …rst-order conditions for the problems of the three types of NGOs equate the marginal






i); B + B
￿ = A
0(￿m):
The free-entry condition for national NGOs is the same as in the basic model:
￿iA
0(￿i) ￿ A(￿i) = F: (29)









Given this, the free-entry conditions imply that
 (B) = F;  (B
￿) = F;  (B + B
￿) = f + F: (30)











28Moreover,  (0) = 0 and  (1) = 1: Therefore, from (30) we get that the marginal
bene…ts of fundraising (and thus equilibrium fundraising e¤orts) are the same for national
NGOs in two countries: B = B￿ and ￿i = ￿
￿
i.
For a multinational NGO, instead, using the relevant …rst-order condition and the fact
that B = B￿, the equilibrium fundraising e¤ort becomes:
￿m = A
0￿1(2B);
and the relevant free-entry condition is now:
 (2B) = f + F: (31)
We can write the free-entry equilibrium fundraising e¤orts as functions of …xed costs, for
national and multinational NGOs:
￿i = ￿
￿
i = e ￿(F); ￿m = e ￿(f + F):
Then, from (21), (22), and (23), we get
L(1 ￿ c)
A0(e ￿(F))




￿e ￿(F) + me ￿(f + F):
The number of national and multinational NGOs is fully described by the parameters of the
model (L;L￿;c;f;F) and the functional form A(:).
Combining the two equations above, we …nd that the multinational NGOs in equilibrium
would have to choose the fundraising e¤ort such that its marginal cost is exactly double of
the marginal cost of fundraising for the national NGOs:
A
0(e ￿(F)) =
A0(e ￿(f + F))
2
:
Clearly, for an arbitrary f, this is a zero-measure case.






Let’s denote the scale advantage of the multinational (in terms of output) with h(￿) =
 (￿B) ￿ ￿ (B), for arbitrary ￿. The scale advantage function h0(￿) is increasing in ￿:
h
0(￿) = B 
0(￿B) ￿  (B):
29Moreover,
h
0(1) = B 
0(B) ￿  (B) > 0:
Thus, h(￿) is increasing in ￿ ￿ 1. Then, in equilibrium, the multinational NGO gets
higher output than the two national NGOs:
 (2B) ￿ 2 (B) > 0 for all B ￿ 0:
But then, from (30) and (31), we obtain f ￿ F > 0, which contradicts our assumption
f < F. Then, there cannot be an equilibrium such that n > 0; n￿ > 0; and m > 0. QED.
6.3 Proof of Proposition 6
For the national NGOs in the home country, under the free-entry condition (29), we get the
equilibrium fundraising e¤ort, as before:
B = A
0(￿i) =) ￿i = e ￿(F);
while using the free-entry condition for multinational NGOs,
￿mA
0(￿m) ￿ A(￿m) = f + F; (32)
we …nd the equilibrium multinational fundraising e¤ort:
B + B
￿ = A
0(￿m) =) ￿m = e ￿(f + F):
Using the expressions for marginal bene…ts of fundrasing (23), we also get
L(1 ￿ c)
A0(e ￿(F))




me ￿(f + F)
= A
0(e ￿(f + F)): (34)




A0(e ￿(f + F)) ￿ A0(e ￿(F))
1

















A0(e ￿(f + F)) ￿ A0(e ￿(F))
:
Analogously, suppose now L￿ > L. We can then immediately characterize the equilibrium






A0(e ￿(f + F)) ￿ A0(e ￿(F))
:
The national entrants in the foreign market would choose the fundraising e¤ort ￿
s
i so as









0(e ￿(f + F)) =) B
￿ = A
0(e ￿(f + F)) ￿ A
0(e ￿(F));





0(e ￿(f + F)) ￿ A





i < e ￿(F):
However, at this fundraising e¤ort level, the output of the national NGO in the foreign
country would fall below the outside option of an NGO entrepreneur. This con…rms that
foreign national NGOs have no incentives to enter in the long-run equilibrium. QED.
6.4 Proof of Proposition 7
Using the free-entry condition for multinationals (32) and given that the marginal bene…ts














31Consider now a fully integrated market (i.e., one single market of size L + L￿). The
number of NGOs in this market should satisfy
m =
h
e ￿(f + F)A















i < e ￿(F), which implies that the payo¤s for a national NGO entrant are
lower than the outside option, F; i.e., n = 0. QED.
6.5 Proof of Proposition 8
Analogously to the analysis above, we can easily show that ￿
s
i > e ￿(F). In other words, the
new national entrants would get a su¢ciently high payo¤ to justify their entry. Then, n > 0










Let’s show that there is no incentives for the entry of a new multinational. The entering
multinational would choose the fundraising e¤ort level ￿
s
m such that its marginal cost, A0(￿
s
m),
equals the marginal bene…t, B+B￿, which, in turn, equals A0(e ￿(F))+A0(e ￿(F)). Given that





0(e ￿(F)) < A
0(e ￿(f + F));
which implies ￿
s
m < e ￿(f + F), i.e. that the payo¤ from being a multinational is lower than
the outside option (f+F), and thus there is no incentive for an entry of a new multinational.
Note that given the free-entry condition for a national NGO, we do not need to check that
there is no incentive for an existing national NGO to become multinational. QED.
326.6 Proof of Lemma 9
The total expected ’transport’ cost for donors is given by
LE
h





































T(b ￿) = tLb ￿
N=2 X
k=1




which, for N large enough, is approximately
T(b ￿) '













2006, US$ mln 











1942 13 528 Poverty relief
CARE 1945 10 624 Poverty relief








Source : Lindenberg and Bryant (2001), Karajkov (2007), www.plan-international.org. Table 2. The MSF’s affiliates and their years of foundation 
Year  Affiliate 
1971  France (headquarter) 
1980  Belgium 
1981  Switzerland 
1984  Netherlands 
1986  Luxemburg 
Spain 
1990  Greece 
United States 
1991  Canada 
1992  Japan 






1994  Australia 
Austria 
1995  United Arab Emirates 
1996  Norway 
Source : Simeant (2005) F
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